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INTRODUCTION
Professor Garda tells a fascinating story about the rise of charter
schools and the emerging system of schools in contemporary New
Orleans, where, as of the 2014–2015 school year, one hundred percent
of the public schools are charter schools.1 This is an important story
with national implications, not only for districts like the one I live in,
Washington, D.C., where almost half of our public school students are

*

Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Aaron
Saiger and the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for inviting me to
participate in the 2014 Cooper Walsh Colloquium. I am grateful for thoughtful
comments on earlier versions of this essay from Kimberly Jenkins Robinson and
Aaron Saiger. My thanks also to Robert Garda for welcoming my comments on his
important Article.
1. Robert Garda, Searching for Equity Amid a System of Schools: The View
from New Orleans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 613, 615 (2015).
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now served by charter schools,2 but also for districts with many fewer
charter schools, or even none at all.
And here is why: the story Professor Garda is telling is not really
about charter schools, or about a tension between charter schools and
typical public schools. The main issues he has identified run much
deeper than that. These issues may be characterized as falling within
three key themes: a tension between what Professor Garda calls
“inclusion equality”3 and “empowerment”4 or “outcome equality”;5 a
tension between centralization and decentralization; and the
relationship between community and governance structures.
In this brief response, I take each of these themes in turn and
situate them in the broader context of American education law; in so
doing I argue that these are the core preoccupations of American
education law writ large.
To that extent, Professor Garda’s
characterization of the open questions confronting New Orleans
somewhat oversimplifies matters. I close by connecting the road
ahead for New Orleans with the path forward for education law more
generally. In particular, I argue, any decision made by New Orleans
(or any jurisdiction) to resolve these tensions is not likely to be
permanent, even though education lawyers continually engage in
efforts to resolve them. Moreover, the likely venues for such efforts,
Professor Garda’s Article teaches, include the state legislature, state
agencies, and local governance structures.6 By focusing on these
venues, Professor Garda’s Article underscores the need for
contemporary legal education about education law to systematically
address questions about law design and legislative and administrative
processes, and not simply case law.
I. INCLUSION EQUALITY VERSUS OUTCOME EQUALITY
Professor Garda traces the idea of inclusion equality back to
Brown v. Board of Education,7 saying that this is the core concern of
the major education civil rights statutes that trace their genesis to

2. See, e.g., Historical Enrollment—Public Schools, D.C. PUB. CHARTER SCH.
BOARD,
https://data.dcpcsb.org/dataset/Historial-Enrollment-to-SY-2014-15/3db5ujzr (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (during the 2014–2015 school year in Washington, D.C.,
about 38,000 students attended charter schools out of close to 86,000 students in
public and charter schools overall).
3. Garda, supra note 1, passim.
4. Id. passim.
5. Id. at 660, 669–70.
6. See infra notes 102–12 and accompanying text.
7. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Brown.8 This view, he says, “demands that every school attempt to
educate every type of student regardless of ability, aptitude, race, or
socioeconomic status.”9 In contrast, he says, empowerment or
outcome equality dates back to the Reagan-era report A Nation At
Risk,10 and is linked to choice because, so the theory went,
empowering parents with choice would lead to improved student
outcomes, regardless of the homogeneity of the students in a school.11
Professor Garda acknowledges that the current all-charter model in
New Orleans is “as far from achieving the new equality as the old
New Orleans schools were from achieving inclusion equality.”12 But
he does not sufficiently acknowledge that the tension between these
visions of equality is embedded in the civil rights statutes themselves,
as well as in developments in traditional public schooling completely
outside the context of charters.13
Consider, for example, one of the sayings often associated with
Brown: that one of the theories animating Brown was that “green
follows white.”14 Under this theory, money and everything it could
buy in terms of educational quality would follow from the integration
of black and white students—not just that integration was the end
goal.15
Or think about Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196416 and
disparate impact theory.17 Under this theory, Title VI precludes not
8. Garda, supra note 1, at 655–56.
9. Id. at 656.
10. Id. at 660 (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 5 (1983)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 664.
13. See generally MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S
EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 33 (2010) (articulating post-Brown questions over
whether, in a variety of settings for a variety of student demographics, “equality is to
be realized through integrated or separate settings”). Professor Garda also focuses
on “inclusion equality” at the school level without considering the extent to which
even schools that serve diverse student populations engage in practices that either
undercut or promote the value of school-level inclusion. See, e.g., James Moody,
Race, School Integration, and Friendship Segregation in America, 107 AM. J. SOC.
679, 707–10 (2001).
14. Martha Minow, We’re All for Equality in U.S. School Reform: But What
Does It Mean?, in JUST SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE
21, 25 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 2010).
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012).
17. Until the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, private
litigants could pursue disparate impact claims under Title VI in court. 532 U.S. 275
(2001). After Sandoval, only agencies may enforce disparate impact Title VI claims.
See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL (2001), available at
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just segregation or intentional differential treatment, but also policies
that result in different outcomes.18 The contemporary focus on
disparities in school discipline and in access to educational resources
directly results from using Title VI to promote equal outcomes.19 Nor
is this some new-fangled gloss on the statute’s original meaning; it is
what President Johnson famously said at Howard University about
the point of the civil rights laws: “We seek not just . . . equality as a
right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.”20
Professor Garda also talks about the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act,21 which is often used for assessing the legality of
programs serving English Language Learners (ELLs).22 Here, too,
while segregation is not permitted,23 neither is it permissible to pay no
attention to effective outcomes; the legal framework under this Act
requires that a program serving ELLs must be proven effective in
overcoming language barriers.24

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf; Olatunde C.A. Johnson,
The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 131 (2014).
18. Johnson, supra note 17, at 136–39.
19. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., to Colleagues 2, 8–10 (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf (discussing disparate
impact theory under Title VI as applied to school resource comparability as a way to
close achievement gaps); Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues 4, 6, 11–13 (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/dcl.pdf (discussing disparate impact
theory under Title VI as applied to school discipline policies and practices as a way to
reduce a loss of instructional time).
20. Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S., Commencement Address at Howard
University: “To Fulfill These Rights” (June 4, 1965) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp; see also
Johnson, supra note 17, at 136–39 (describing contemporaneous agency
interpretation of Title VI to encompass the outcome-oriented disparate impact, not
simply the input-oriented disparate treatment).
21. Garda, supra note 1, at 652–56 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (2012)).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012) (providing that “[n]o State shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or
national origin, by . . . the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its
instructional programs”); see also Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 438–41 (2009)
(describing claim brought under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act to
improve instruction for ELLs).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (precluding “deliberate segregation by an educational
agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within
schools”).
24. See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 477–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the
widely used three-prong test under 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) set forth in Castaneda v.
Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981), and noting that no party challenged the district
court’s use of the Castaneda test); see also The Provision of an Equal Educational
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As for the treatment of students with disabilities, Professor Garda
is correct that the law requires education in the least restrictive
environment25—that is, education as much as possible with general
education students26—but it nonetheless permits, even in traditional
public schools, specialized and essentially segregated classrooms, such
as dedicated autism classes.27 Moreover, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)28 permits parents to sue school
districts to pay for private placements in specialized schools for
children with disabilities under certain circumstances.29
More
generally, IDEA empowers parents with the ability to bargain with
schools over the services their children should receive.30 And nothing
in the civil rights laws got rid of state-run and state-funded specialized
schools for the blind or the deaf.31 The value of the integration

Opportunity to Limited-English Proficient Students, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR
C.R., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/eeolep/index.html (last modified Mar.
14, 2005) (describing the Office for Civil Rights’s inquiry into whether school
districts’ services for ELLs are successful, not simply into whether ELLs are sitting in
class with fluent English speakers).
25. See Garda, supra note 1, at 656.
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
27. See, e.g., id. (permitting separate schooling for children with disabilities
“when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 35TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 2013, 46–
48 (2013), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2013/parts-bc/35th-idea-arc.pdf (describing percentages of students with various kinds of
disabilities placed in different settings for different portions of the day); see also
Schools with Dedicated Autism Classrooms: SY 2012–2013, D.C. PUB. SCHS.,
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/In+the+Classroom/Special+Education/Autism+Program+an
d+Resources/Schools+with+Dedicated+Autism+Classrooms (last visited Feb. 24,
2015) (listing twenty-seven such schools).
28. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400–1482 (2012)).
29. See, e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch.
Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); see also Recognized
Schools for Children with Autism, BEST SCH., http://www.thebestschools.org/blog/
2012/03/10/schools-children-autism/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (noting that “many
parents desire to place their autistic children in private schools specifically dedicated
to helping children with that disability” and that local school districts may sometimes
be required to pay the cost of tuition).
30. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of
Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1435–50 (2011) (describing
inequities that result from this bargaining process).
31. See, e.g., Schools and Programs for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Students in the
United States, GALLAUDET UNIV. LAURENT CLERC NAT’L DEAF EDUC. CENTER,
http://www.gallaudet.edu/clerc_center/information_and_resources/info_to_go/resourc
es/websites_of_schools_and_programs_for_deaf_students_.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2015) (providing links to state-run and other specialized schools for deaf and hard of
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presumption in educational disability law (what Professor Garda calls
more generally “inclusion equality”) is in fact deeply contested, as is
its relation to outcomes for students with disabilities.32
Professor Garda mentions Title IX only in passing and only in a
footnote,33 but there is a tension even within Title IX about inclusion
and outcome equality. On the one hand, the statute says you cannot
be subjected to discrimination in educational programs that receive
federal funds on the basis of sex.34 On the other hand, the statute
contains numerous exceptions.35 And, as Professor Garda notes, the
Title IX regulations as redrafted almost a decade ago now explicitly
permit single-sex classrooms and schools in the traditional public
school system, as well as the charter school system, where the purpose
of that exclusionary focus is to improve academic achievement.36
Here, too, the relationship between inclusion equality and outcome
equality is vigorously debated.37

hearing
students);
Carmen
Willings,
Schools
for
the
Blind,
TEACHINGVISUALLYIMPAIRED.COM,
http://www.teachingvisuallyimpaired.com/
schools-for-the-blind.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (providing links to state-run and
other specialized schools for blind and visually impaired students).
32. Compare, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty
Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2006) (questioning the value of an
individualized integration presumption for all students with disabilities in light of
potentially better outcomes in less inclusive settings), with, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Response, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 157 (2007), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/156-U-Pa-L-RevPENNumbra-157.pdf (arguing that “many children with disabilities should be in
more integrated settings than school officials think”), and Mark C. Weber, Response,
A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. Pa. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 174 (2007), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1005&context=penn_law_review_online (arguing in support of both
integration and educational outcomes).
33. See Garda, supra note 1, at 656 n.244.
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”).
35. Id. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) (identifying exceptions for certain admissions policies;
religious organizations; military training institutions; fraternities and sororities;
scouting, boy or girl conferences; father/son or mother/daughter activities; and
scholarship awards given by beauty pageants).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2014); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY CLASSES AND EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES (2014), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf.
37. Compare, e.g., Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex
Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 15 (arguing
that single-sex education is particularly dangerous for children of color), with, e.g.,
Rosemary Salomone, Rights and Wrongs in the Debate Over Single-Sex Schooling,
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Moving beyond contested visions of equality embedded in the civil
rights laws, magnet programs in traditional public schools also offer a
useful comparison with the charter school model. Admission to
magnet schools is often subject to certain criteria, whether by
academic test,38 by specialized skill or talent,39 by subject-matter
interest,40 or sometimes even by identity or affinity group.41 So
inclusion for all-comers need not be the core focus of a system of
traditional public schools. At the same time, magnet schools and
related methods of providing a variety of public school offerings
within a school system may be used to promote racial and
socioeconomic integration.42 Indeed, it is often argued that magnet
schools designed properly can encourage both integration and
improved academic outcomes.43
For that matter, one early plan for charter schools themselves was
that they were supposed to be inclusive.44 When Albert Shanker

93 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2013) (arguing that, while single-sex education can further
equality, context matters).
38. See, e.g., Exam Schools, BOS. PUB. SCHS., http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/
exam (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
39. See, e.g., Mission and History, FIORELLO H. LAGUARDIA HIGH SCH. MUSIC &
ART & PERFORMING ARTS, http://laguardiahs.org/mission-history/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2015).
40. See, e.g., Phelps Architecture, Construction, and Engineering High School,
D.C. PUB. SCHS., http://profiles.dcps.dc.gov/Phelps+Architecture%2c+Construction
%2c+and+Engineering+High+School (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
41. See, e.g., The Harvey Milk High School, HETRICK MARTIN INST., http://
www.hmi.org/page.aspx?pid=230 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
42. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 115–130 (2001)
(explaining the value of “magnetiz[ing]” a whole school system with specialized
schools which parents must choose in order to promote integration); Genevieve
Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankenberg, Reviving Magnet Schools: Strengthening a
Successful Choice Option, C.R. PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2012), http://civilrights
project.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-magnetschools-strengthening-a-successful-choice-option.
43. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Turnaround Schools and Charter Schools that
Work: Moving Beyond Separate but Equal, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY
288–96 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2012) (discussing research on effective and
integrative magnet schools).
44. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A SMARTER CHARTER:
FINDING WHAT WORKS FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 9–10
(2014). Whether this was the central goal of all founders of the charter school
movement is doubtful. See John E. Coons, A Little Context for Al Shanker’s
“Original Charter School Vision,” REDEFINED (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.redefined
online.org/2014/09/a-little-context-for-al-shankers-original-charter-school-vision/.
While the vision of inclusive charter schools was not universally shared, it was
certainly Shanker’s own vision.
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outlined a vision for this new kind of school in the mid-1980s, he
touted what he perceived as the superior ability of this new kind of
school to ensure that students of all backgrounds would learn
together, in contrast to traditional public schools that were failing at
that mission.45
At the same time, traditional public schools have long been
focused—or have had that focus thrust upon them, depending on how
you look at it—on outcomes. Think about the now longstanding
focus on achievement gaps.46 Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, now No Child Left Behind, has from its
inception funded compensatory education, to supplement state and
local funding; its goal has not been to ensure inclusive classrooms.47
Think about the standards and accountability movement.48 Think
about the decades and decades of school finance litigation;49 whether
under theories of resource equity or adequacy, these cases have been
focused on the inputs required to achieve the desired outcomes of
academic success.50
All of this is to say that Professor Garda oversimplifies matters in
saying that the traditional view dating back to Brown and the original
civil rights legislation has been focused on inclusion equality, that all
traditional public schools have had to educate all comers, and that
inclusion is the core focus of the education civil rights laws.51 Instead,
the debate between inclusion equality and outcome equality in New

45. KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., From the ECS State Policy Database: Student Achievement—
Closing the Achievement Gap, EDUC. COMM’N STATES ST. POL’Y DATABASE,
http://www.ecs.org/html/Document.asp?chouseid=5939 (follow “From the ECS State
Policy Database: Student Achievement—Closing the Achievement Gap” hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (listing state laws focused on reducing the achievement
gap).
47. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79
Stat. 27, § 201 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012)). To be sure, this federal
money was the hook that was to make the equity-focused Title VI effective in schools
that until then had been almost entirely non-reliant on federal funds, but it is
nonetheless true that the federal grant money itself has always discussed educational
needs rather than inclusion equality.
48. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School
District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 872–875 (2006) (describing this movement).
49. See, e.g., JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY,
TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 145–90 (2010).
50. See, e.g., id. at 151; see also William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When

“Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why
It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 595–604 (2006); Saiger, supra note 48, at 891–98.
51. Garda, supra note 1, at 655–56.
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Orleans reflects a tension that goes far beyond charters schools versus
traditional public schools. It is a tension at the core of the field of
education law. Professor Garda’s claim that the traditional view of
inclusion equality is lost in the move to an all-charter district52 thus
makes the problem seem both too easy and too recent.
II. CENTRALIZATION V ERSUS D ECENTRALIZATION
Professor Garda argues that part of the problems with the current
system of schools in New Orleans is the loss of centralization
associated with traditional public schools.53 I agree with Professor
Garda that centralization is more typically associated with traditional
public schools, while decentralization is more typically associated with
charter schools.
But this arrangement is merely typical and
contingent, not required of either system, and the reverse
arrangements exist. Consider, for example, decentralized schoolbased management efforts54 or the earlier community control
movement55 in traditional public schools, in contrast to charter
management organizations that have centralized certain services and
teaching standards.56
Nor is it always clear whether centralization or decentralization
better promotes equality as a general matter. Professor Garda gives
some good examples of why New Orleans’s recent move towards
centralization of the school admissions process, the expulsion process,
and a system for serving special education students have been
important steps to promoting equality for students of color and
students with disabilities.57 But consider other centralizing moves that
have less of an equality-promoting result. Centralizing budgets so
that all schools in a district get a certain number of teaching lines and
fixed set of services for its student body can result in unequal

Garda, supra note 1, at 664.
Garda, supra note 1, at 620.
Saiger, supra note 48, at 873.
James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives
Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1305–09 (2005).
56. See, e.g., KIPP FOUND., KIPP FRAMEWORK FOR EXCELLENT TEACHING
(2011), available at http://kipp.org/files/dmfile/07022012KFET.pdf (presenting unified
framework for KIPP schools nationwide); What is a Charter Management
Organization?, UNCOMMON SCHS., http://www.uncommonschools.org/our-approach/
how-we-work (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (describing centralized services provided to
schools in this charter network nationwide).
57. Garda, supra note 1, at 638, 641–43, 649–52.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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distribution of funds, to the extent that some schools attract more
senior, and therefore more highly paid, teachers.58
As for the line Professor Garda chooses to mark as an indication of
centralization—the city of New Orleans—this line is consistent with
the standard way of organizing the delivery of American educational
services,59 but it is at another level arbitrary, or even itself harmful.
There are inherent inequalities in the fact that our school systems are
organized around school district, local jurisdictional lines.60 This is
the core premise of the state-level school finance cases: that funding
variations from district to district are unfair with educationally
disastrous consequences.61 Different districts also gain reputations for
serving particular populations of students particularly well and so
attract those students,62 similar to a dynamic Professor Garda
identifies in different charter schools63—but that might mean that the
other districts continue to serve that population of kids just as poorly,
with little internal pressure to change. That inter-jurisdiction
variation seems no less troublesome than the intra-jurisdiction
variation that troubles Professor Garda.
For that matter, state-by-state inequities are also vast. There is
more funding inequality between states than there is within states.64

58. See, e.g., Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending
Inequities Help Some Schools Fail, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY
201, 204 (Diane Ravitch ed., 2004).
59. James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED
WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 57–58 (2004).
60. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 49, at 1–17; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past,

Present, and Future of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of
Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 439–47 (2012); Aaron J. Saiger, The
School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 495–96 (2010) (arguing that
periodic redrawing of school district boundary lines would help mitigate these
inequities).
61. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 49, at 145–90; Robinson, supra note 60, at 445–47.
62. See, e.g., Noteworthy Special Education: Elementary Schools,
http://insideschools.org/special-education/noteworthy-special-edINSIDESCHOOLS,
elementary (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (identifying programs in each of New York
City’s five boroughs that do a particularly good job at serving students with
disabilities); Vicky Nguyen et al., Public Schools Delay or Deny Special Education
Services for Most Vulnerable Students, NBC BAY AREA (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Public-Schools-Delay-Deny-SpecialEducation-Services-231960511.html (describing a school district with a well-regarded
program for children with autism that rejected an interview for fear of publicizing the
program and attracting too many families to the district).
63. Garda, supra note 1, at 662–63.
64. See Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2047 (2006).
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There is great variation on how students in each state perform on
national tests.65 And yet, much in federal education law protects
these various decentralized lines.66 No Child Left Behind, for
example, required states to implement a standardized testing regime,
but it permitted states to design their own tests.67 Some federal
education funding formulas are based in part on how much the states
themselves spend.68 And federal special education law permits
districts to determine what is appropriate for each child without
requiring any kind of standardized best practices approach.69
Yet, as federal education law protects these aspects of state- and
district-level deference, the very same laws require states and districts
to follow other centralized requirements—a tension that James Ryan,
now Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, calls “the
federalism fence.”70 State education law, too, contains conflicting
tendencies towards centralization and decentralization at the same
time.71
The question of centralization versus decentralization is thus, like
the meaning of equality, one of the core preoccupations of American
education law, not just a distinction between traditional public
schools and charter schools.72 In this light, Professor Garda’s focus on
65. See id. at 2074–77.
66. See generally Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High
Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287 (2013). For an
argument that federal education law should protect these lines still further, see, e.g.,
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Case for Educational Federalism: Protecting Educational
Policy from the National Government’s Diseconomies of Scale, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1941 (2012).
67. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 944–61 (2004).
68. See Liu, supra note 64, at 2094–2100.
69. Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1474–77.
70. Ryan, supra note 67, at 987; see also Michael Heise, The Political Economy of
Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 151–56 (2006) (responding to Professor
Ryan with the counter-suggestion that the federal government should “get off the
federalism fence” only if it is willing to fund the full extent of its conditional spending
laws).
71. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 59, at 58–60 (describing “divergent and somewhat
contradictory trends in state education governance” over the last few decades, in
which state law has both centralized certain functions of education law and,
sometimes in the same states, decentralized others).
72. Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal’s recent lawsuit against the federal
Department of Education alleges that Race to the Top’s support of the Common
Core State Standards is an impermissible federal intrusion into state and local
matters and falls neatly within this line of controversy, and lies outside the context of
charter schools. See Complaint at 1, Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:14-cv-00534SDD-RLB, 2014 WL 4211009 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2014).
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centralization of services within the New Orleans jurisdictional lines
seems incongruous with the broader scope of his concerns.
III. COMMUNITY AND GOVERNANCE
Professor Garda concludes by saying that New Orleans “must
decide what type of equality it wants to pursue: inclusion equality,
empowerment and outcome equality, or a mix of the two,” using the
tools of centralization or decentralization to get there.73 This point
seems fair enough. But to say that New Orleans has to make these
decisions is to beg the questions of who constitutes New Orleans and
how New Orleans should reach its decisions. This brings me to the
third theme of Professor Garda’s Article that is a core preoccupation
of American education law: the relationship between community and
governance structures.
Professor Garda does not identify who in New Orleans should be
making these decisions, but he does refer to a likely cast of characters
throughout the Article, including parents, teachers, students, school
administrators, elected officials in the city, elected officials in the
state, bureaucrats at each level in a number of entities, community
organizers, and charter management operators. “No-kids-in-school
voters” might usefully be added to this list.74
Of course, there is likely to be much diversity of viewpoint among
these groups, and even within each group itself. For example, among
parents in New Orleans, there are no doubt parents who are perfectly
happy with their choice of school.75 There are parents who are
unhappy with their choice, whether because the school is not meeting
their child’s needs,76 because their child did not get into one of the
schools they actually wanted,77 because their child was expelled or
suspended in a trigger-quick kind of way,78 or some other reason
entirely. There are parents who might be happy with their own
child’s school but who nonetheless find problems with the system
overall and so contribute to filing a complaint with the federal
73. Garda, supra note 1, at 669.
74. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LANDUSE POLICIES 148 (2001).
75. Garda, supra note 1, at 632 (noting that eighty percent of parents receive one
of their top three choice schools).
76. Id. at 646–52 (describing ways many charter schools fail to meet the needs of
students with disabilities).
77. Id. at 633 (describing parent help centers overwhelmed with requests to
change schools after the lottery).
78. Id. at 639–43 (describing problems with expulsions and suspensions).
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Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, the Department
of Justice, or the state.79 There are parents who did not really choose
to send their child anywhere, given the large number of parents for
whom the system of choice is little more than a mirage.80 And those
are just the parents.
As to teachers, there are the traditional teachers who were fired en
masse from the old system, whom Professor Garda describes as the
black middle class, who presumably among themselves have a variety
of different views about the public good.81 There are the newer
teachers, whom Professor Garda describes as largely white, non-local,
and Teach-For-America-affiliated.82
These “TFA’ers,”83 too,
probably have a bunch of different views. And the same variation in
viewpoint can likely be made for any subset of the broader New
Orleans community.
How should the authority to decide what the community wants
from its educational offerings be allocated among these various
members of the community? This question permeates much of the
foundational constitutional doctrine in American education law.84
Should parents be allowed to opt their children out of public school in
favor of religious, other, or no formal education; or should schools
protect children against their parents’ wishes and socialize them into
the public school system?85 Should students be allowed to voice their
views without fear of punishment inside the schoolhouse gates,86 or
should teachers and administrators be allowed to limit these views to
educate the student speakers or protect other students from their
speech?87 Should a student’s right to attend a racially integrated
school extend across jurisdictional boundaries, or should local

79. See generally id. at 637–38, 640–41, 653 (describing complaints).
80. Id. at 630–39 (describing barriers to making effective school choices).
81. Id. at 625–26.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW xi–xii
(5th ed. 2012) (identifying as “one of the great themes of educational policy and the
law . . . the scope of liberty that students, teachers, and families have with respect to
schooling,” and identifying “tensions among the interests of the state, the family, and
the child in education”).
85. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of
the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
86. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988)
(Brennan J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
87. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276;
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
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officials be able to treat their geographic lines as inviolate?88 How
should a school system balance the rights and interests of competing
groups of students,89 or competing groups of parents,90 or competing
groups of teachers?91
Given the breadth in the membership of the community and the
variety of views held by each subset, it is unclear what it means to say
that the community needs to decide what its vision of equality is. This
is why the issue of community is closely related to the issue of
governance. Community members can make decisions only within
governance structures, after all. And although Professor Garda refers
to the transformation of governance structures in New Orleans from a
school system to a system of schools,92 I remain uncertain about
exactly what governance structure or processes Professor Garda
envisions as being the right locus for New Orleans’s decision about
what kind of equality it wants. Modifying the state statute that
designed the charter sector’s primacy in New Orleans? Modifying the
regulations governing the charter sector promulgated by the state
agency? Enlisting the support of courts or civil rights agencies to
issue rulings or oversee compliance agreements? Street-level protests
to pressure one of these? Community organizing to work with the
new “parent trigger law” to pressure the system, or to expand that
law, or to rescind it?93
This open set of possibilities in New Orleans parallels a broader
shift in education governance over the course of the last half of the
twentieth century. One of the major developments in American
education law during this time has been the expansion of governance
models beyond the school district as the main source of control over
schools to a multitude of players: the state education bureaucracy,
federal agency oversight, mayoral control, state takeover, school-

88. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
89. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
90. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982).
91. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
92. Garda, supra note 1, at 615, 620–25.
93. See Lauren McGaughy, Bobby Jindal Signs RSD “Parent Trigger” Bill into
Law, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 17, 2013, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/06/
jindal_rsd_failing_petition_la.html.
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based management, and more.94 As a recent work on education
governance put it, “who leads when everyone is in charge?”95
Professor Garda may be right, then, that New Orleans needs to
decide what vision of equality it wants,96 but the community is a vast
and a varied one; there are any number of governance structures it
could adopt, contest, or work within to make and implement that
decision, and the choices before it would exist even without the allcharter system of schools.
IV. WHAT NEXT FOR NEW ORLEANS? WHAT NEXT FOR
EDUCATION LAW?
To say that equality, decentralization, community, and governance
are the key preoccupations of education law, as I have done, is itself,
in a way, to beg the question: What next for New Orleans? I will not
pretend to have the answer. But in response to Professor Garda’s
observation that New Orleans needs to decide what kind of equality it
wants, my instinct is that, in a way, New Orleans—or at least some
subset of it—has already decided what vision of equality it wants. In
other words, the status quo did not just happen; it reflects legal and
policy judgments about what the schools should look like.
Implicit in Professor Garda’s largely descriptive piece, then, is the
normative judgment that New Orleans has thus far made the wrong
choice, or at least that the choice is an insufficient one. Instead, he
seems to suggest, inclusion equality should not be abandoned;97 more
centralization of education policy is necessary in order to protect
vulnerable populations within the city;98 and community voices that
have not prevailed (that is, the parents and former teachers ill served

94. See generally Robert A. Garda, Jr., & David S. Doty, The Legal Impact of
Emerging Governance Models on Public Education and Its Office Holders, 45 URB.
LAW. 21 (2013); Patrick McGuinn & Paul Manna, Education Governance in
America: Who Leads When Everyone Is in Charge?, in EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REFORM: OVERCOMING THE STRUCTURAL
BARRIERS TO SCHOOL REFORM (Paul Manna & Patrick McGuinn eds., 2013); Saiger,
supra note 48, at 862–85.
95. McGuinn & Manna, supra note 94, at 1.
96. Garda, supra note 1, at 665.
97. Cf. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 599, 652 (2011) (arguing in favor of “multiracial schools where individual
cultures flourish rather than subordinate, assimilate, or segregate”).
98. Cf. Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter
Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655 (2012) (arguing that special education students’ civil
rights would be better protected in charter schools by a number of changes to
centralized law at the federal level, the state level, and in charter authorizer
agreements).
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by the current system) should push for different governance
structures where their input will be implemented going forward.99
Whether or not this is in fact Professor Garda’s conclusion about
what should be next for New Orleans, this possibility gives rise to two
implications, both of which I offer in the form of responses to a
question: What next for education law?
First, these tensions that preoccupy education law are impossible to
resolve in any lasting way. Both inclusion equality and outcome
equality are valuable, depending on context. Both centralization and
decentralization have their place, depending on circumstances. All
members of a community can make important contributions to the
process of educational decision-making, both as distinct groups and as
individuals with different viewpoints within any given group. And
many different governance structures can be worthwhile. Because
there is value on all sides, any decision in any given context is likely to
be shifting and contingent. The tensions are, thus, not likely to be
resolved permanently, in New Orleans or anywhere else.
Second, attempting to resolve these tensions in the context of
specific policy and legal choices is what education lawyers do. It is,
therefore, critical for those of us who teach education law to give our
students the tools they need to move forward in this endeavor. In this
regard, while I have suggested that Professor Garda has somewhat
oversimplified matters, he has nonetheless done a service to the field
by framing the immediate and critical question of New Orleans’s path
in the context of these broader questions about equality,
centralization, and community and governance. Because of the
importance of these themes to the field of contemporary education
law, I can imagine using Professor Garda’s Article as the introductory
reading to an education law course, previewing the questions that will
recur over the semester.
The Article sets up one more critical element for such a course: it
highlights the need for an expanded toolkit for the twenty-first
century education lawyer. It is striking the way the legal landscape
has shaped education in New Orleans—less by courts than by
legislatures and agencies. Professor Garda does reference a few
lawsuits under both federal100 and state law.101 But although these are

99. Cf. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from
New Orleans, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 97 (2011) (describing racial and socioeconomic
divide in New Orleans schools, suggesting that low-income parents need to be better
included, and identifying governance changes that could help do so).
100. See Garda, supra note 1, at 638, 650.
101. Id. at 625 n.57.
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the typical tools law students learn about in education law (and other)
classes, in reality, it has not been judicial opinions that have shaped
the New Orleans educational system.
Instead, it seems to me that Professor Garda is telling a story of the
importance of extra-judicial legal processes in contemporary
education law. The story is one of law design—the statutes,102
regulations,103 and system-wide104 or school-level policies105 that can be
crafted in any number of ways.106 It is a story about the importance of
legislative lawyering.107 It is a story about the importance of using the
administrative machinery,108 whether through a complaint process109
or through the process of regulatory development.110 It is also a story
about negotiation, conflict resolution, and coalition building,111
important skills that lawyers can take with them to transform
systems.112

102. Id. at 626, 634–35, 656 (describing legislature’s actions in crafting the charter
statute).
103. Id. at 636–37 (describing regulations on lottery preferences); id. at 667
(describing new regulations on charter renewal and revocation).
104. Id. at 639–40, 641–42 (describing such policies).
105. Id. at 641 (describing such policies).
106. Cf. Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 488 (2013) (arguing that charters and vouchers can be
“appropriately structured” to “serve any end that we wish”); Forman, Jr., supra note
55, at 1316–19 (arguing that vouchers in the abstract are “neither and both” “good or
bad”—“it all depends on how the plan is constructed”).
107. See Garda, supra note 1, at 658 (describing efforts to enlist the legislature to
make changes). See generally Chai Rachel Feldblum, The Art of Legislative
Lawyering and the Six Circles Theory of Advocacy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 785
(2003) (describing and explaining the importance of, and outlining pedagogy for,
legislative lawyering).
108. Cf. Eloise Pasachoff, Advocates, Federal Agencies, and the Education of
Children with Disabilities, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 461 (2014) (arguing that
education law students and education lawyers should be taught more explicitly to
take advantage of the work of federal agencies).
109. See Garda, supra note 1, at 637–38, 640–41, 653 (describing civil rights
complaints to the state, to the U.S. Department of Education, and to the U.S.
Department of Justice).
110. Id. at 636, 667 (describing relevant regulations).
111. Id. at 622–24, 657–59 (describing a tense relationship between the educational
administrative oversight bodies in New Orleans); id. at 650–51 (describing a
cooperative agreement reached between these two entities).
112. See generally In Memoriam: Roger Fisher, 126 HARV. L. REV. 875 (2013)
(describing the importance of teaching these skills in law school through written
tribute to the founder of the field); THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
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Those TFA’ers that Professor Garda describes as taking over the
New Orleans school system113 often leave teaching to go to law school,
after all.114 TFA recruits’ short-term commitment to teaching before
going to graduate or professional school is, indeed, one of the main
critiques of Teach for America.115 Professor Garda’s Article helps
identify what they—and many others—need to learn when they take
an education law class.
Outside the classroom, the Article helps identify the breadth of
arenas, the variety of skills, and the complexity of issues with which
practicing education lawyers need to engage—in New Orleans and
beyond. Professor Garda’s “View from New Orleans” turns out to be
a wide-angle lens.

113. See Garda, supra note 1, at 625–26.
114. See, e.g., Graduate School and Employer Partnerships, TEACH FOR AM.,
https://www.teachforamerica.org/why-teach-for-america/compensation-and-benefits/
graduate-school-and-employer-partnerships (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (describing
partnerships with fifty-eight law schools, among other graduate programs, that
“actively recruit corps members and alumni”). Fordham University School of Law,
at which this Colloquium took place, treats Teach for America experience as “very
desirable” in the admissions process, according to a dean in the J.D. admissions
office. Interview with Stephen Brown, Associate Dean of Admissions at the Fordham
University School of Law, TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM (Nov. 2009), http://www.top-lawschools.com/stephen-brown-interview.html. My own institution, Georgetown Law,
counts fifty-six Teach for America alumni in its current J.D. program. Email from
Andrew Cornblatt, Dean of Admissions, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to Eloise
Pasachoff (Dec. 5, 2014, 14:57 EST) (on file with author); see also Caroline M.
McKay, Continuing the Corps Mentality: From TFA to HLS, HARVARD CRIMSON,
Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2011/4/14/school-lawtfa-corps/ (stating that Georgetown Law, the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and Harvard Law School are the three most commonly attended law schools by
Teach for America alumni).
115. See, e.g., Zach Schonfeld, Meet the Teach for America Resistance Movement
That’s Growing from Within, WIRE (July 12, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/national/
2013/07/meet-teach-america-resistance-movement-s-growing-within/67125/.

